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I. INTRODUCTION

When Hide Nakajima and Dennis Wood, President and Vice-President
of Atari Games, approached Nintendo in 1987 with the desire of licensing
Atari's video game titles for the phenomenally popular Nintendo
Entertainment System, they expected to receive star treatment.' Atari,
having founded the industry in the late 1970s, had substantial name
recognition, and only Nakajima and Wood could offer Nintendo access to
Atari's impressive library of popular arcade games.2 As such, Nakajima
and Wood asked Nintendo to waive terms in its standard licensing
agreement that limited licensees to publishing five new titles per year and
restricted licensees from releasing these titles on other platforms for two
years.' Nintendo's top executives, Minoru Arakawa and Howard Lincoln,
saw no need to negotiate: the Nintendo Entertainment System had a
market share between eighty-six and ninety-three percent during 1987.
Arakawa "shrugged as if to indicate it was not personal"-the licensing
terms were a quality control mechanism that Nintendo had to apply evenly
to all licensees. 5 Atari relented and signed a licensing agreement that
included both of the unwanted conditions.6

1. STEVEN KENT, THE ULTIMATE HISTORY OF VIDEO GAMES 372 (2001); DAVID SHEFF,
GAME OVER: PRESS START TO CONTINUE 243 (2d ed., CyberActive Publ'g 1999).
2. KENT, supra note 1, at 372; SHEFF, supra note 1,at 246.
3. KENT, supra note 1, at 372.

4. Id.at 360.
5. SHEFF, supra note 1, at 243; KENT, supra note 1, at 351.
6. SHEFF, supra note 1, at 243.
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The license came amidst a computer chip shortage that prevented
Nintendo from releasing adequate quantities of its video games.7 Licensees
received only twenty-five percent of the blank cartridges-the storage
medium which contained the video game software-they had ordered, and
despite the popularity of Atari's titles, it was treated the same as other
licensees.' Atari, estimating that it was supplying only ten percent of the
demand for its top titles, found alternate sources for the scarce chips, but
Nintendo rejected the idea, claiming that the alternates were of
unacceptable quality.9 Dennis Wood was incensed: "We're talking about
chips for games, not for a Cray computer."" °
Sensing the frustration of his new licensee, Nintendo's president
invited Atari's executives to his decadent home in Seattle for dinner in
August 1988.11 After an exquisite feast, Arakawa invited his guests outside
for drinks.' 2 Then, as he has a strange tendency to do at awkward
moments, he fell asleep-mid-conversation with Atari's Nakajima. 3
The faux pas had a symbolic element. As Arakawa snoozed on his deck
that evening, Atari was engaged in a full-scale effort to reverse engineer
Nintendo's technology in order to publish unlicensed games for the
popular video game hardware.14 A year before the chip shortage and the
licensing negotiations, Atari had commissioned engineer Donald Paauw
to reverse engineer the security system that prevented unauthorized
cartridges from functioning on the Nintendo Entertainment System. A year
after the fateful dinner party, a similar engineer working for a similar
software company, Accolade, would complete a similar reverse
engineering feat on a similar piece of hardware, the Sega Genesis. 5
The results of these efforts and the ensuing litigation would determine
the ability of innovators to engage in the reverse engineering of computer
programs during the decade that saw the proliferation of the Internet and
countless other technological marvels. Engineers today face a diminished
ability to reverse engineer, due to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act

7. Id.at 244.
8. Id.
9. Id.at 244-45.
10. Id.at 245.
11. SHEFF, supra note 1, at237.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 246.
15. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1395 (N.D. Cal. 1992), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
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and developments in contract law. This Article will illustrate and explore
16
the shift by comparing software lawsuits from the 1990s and 2000s.
In an effort to facilitate efficient research by practitioners, I have
endeavored to separate my normative discussion from an objective
overview of the legal landscape. Part II lays out this legal landscape, while
Part IV provides commentary.
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF REVERSE ENGINEERING
DURING THE 1990S

A. Reverse EngineeringIs Accepted and Perceivedas
Beneficial to Society
Reverse engineering is the practice of "starting with the known product
and working backward to divine the process which aided in its
development or manufacture."' 7 More broadly, it is "the process of
extracting know-how or knowledge from a human-made artifact."' 8
The Supreme Court gave a resounding endorsement for reverse
engineering in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, which was argued
around the same time that Accolade was reverse engineering the Sega
Genesis. 19 The Bonito Court struck down a Florida law prohibiting the
application of the "direct molding process" to boat hulls.2" The process,
which the Bonito Court considered a form of reverse engineering, allowed
boat manufacturers to quickly and easily replicate the designs of their
competitors.2' The statute was enacted to protect innovations in boat hull
design, as it requires massive effort and expense to design an innovative
boat hull, but only hours to replicate it using the direct molding process.22
The Court struck the law as preempted by federal patent law, but in doing
so, it extolled the virtues of reverse engineering. First, federal policy
dictates "that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common
good unless they are protected by a valid patent."23 Second, "[r]everse
engineering ofchemical and mechanical articles in the public domain often
16. The choice of video game-related reverse engineering is not arbitrary. Many of the
leading cases on the topic of reverse engineering fall within this industry.
17. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
18. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1577 (2002).
19. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
20. Id. at 144.
21. Id. at 160.
22. Id.at 144, 158.
23. Id. at 159-60 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969)).
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leads to significant advances in technology. ' 24 Third, "the competitive
reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an
incentive to develop
inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of
25
patentability.
Given the facts of the case, these commendations are particularly
indicative of the Court's extremely high esteem for reverse engineering.
Market-based, non-legal protections against reverse engineering (e.g.,
incentives to innovate) are strongest when (a) an initial innovator has a
long 'lead time,' or duration of time before competing products enter the
marketplace, and (b) reverse engineering is costly. 26 Thus, if society
benefits from "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts," it
might prefer protections against reverse engineering where innovative
advancements can be quickly and cheaply reverse engineered.27 Where
reverse engineering is costly and time-consuming, however, protection is
less necessary in order for innovators to make an adequate return. Further,
those parties that do reverse engineer in these markets are more likely to
be innovators themselves (second generation innovation), as the gain from
mere replication is lower where lead time is high and reverse engineering
is costly.
In Bonito, defendant Thunder Craft Boats was scarcely engaging in any
sort of reverse engineering at all. The direct molding process is closer to
photocopying than reverse engineering. 28 Few would consider a
programmer photocopying a computer program to be reverse engineering.
In fact, the Atari court exempted any use of photocopied Nintendo
program code from Atari's reverse engineering defense.2 ' Boat hull design
is the quintessential case for restrictions on reverse engineering: a costly
innovation could be cheaply and immediately reverse engineered, thus
providing almost no incentive to innovate.3" From a purely legal
standpoint, the Florida law was almost certainly preempted by patent law,
but in a normative debate about the prudence of the statute, the defendant
would have struggled to prevail. Still, the Rehnquist court held reverse
engineering in such esteem at the dawn of the 1990s that O'Connor's
unanimous opinion waxed poetic about its virtues for two pages.3
24. Bonito, 489 U.S. at 160.

25. Id.
26. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1586.
27. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
28. See, e.g., Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684-85 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing the
direct molding process).
29. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842-43 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
30. Contra Bonito, 489 U.S. at 160.
31. Id. at 159-60.
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B. Copyingfor Purposes of Reverse EngineeringIs a Fair Use Under
CopyrightLaw
Until computer programmers sought copyright protection for their
programs, copyright law had little need for a reverse engineering
doctrine.32 After all, paintings and novels are not often the target of reverse
engineering in the narrow sense of the term.33
A trio of cases establishes that reverse engineering of software
components in video game hardware is permissible, even if intermediate
copying occurs. The most often cited is Sega Enterprises v. Accolade,
Inc. 34 Sega developed and marketed the Sega Genesis video game
console. 3' Accolade produced software titles for IBM-compatible personal
computers and wanted to make its products available on the Genesis
console.36 However, Sega, like Nintendo, only licensed the initialization
code and interface protocols necessary to produce games for its console to
software developers that agreed to release titles exclusively for the
Genesis. 37 This initialization code, called the trademark security system
(TMSS), contained four bytes of data that were included in the video game
software.38 When a user inserted a game into the console and turned on the
power, the Genesis would39 search the software and initialize the game only
upon finding the TMSS.
Unwilling to agree to the exclusivity contract, Accolade "'reverseengineered' Sega's video game programs in order to discover the
requirements for compatibility with the Genesis console."4 ° Its engineers
decompiled (or "disassembled") the object code of a Genesis console and
software titles, printed copies of the resulting source code, and analyzed
the printouts." They also experimented with the console and programs in
32. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1585.
33. Id.
34. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
35. Id. at 1514.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.at 1515. The four bytes of data spelled "S-E-G-A."
39. Sega,977 F.2d at 1515.
40. Id.at 1514.
41. Id.at 1515. Object code is the machine-readable signal code of a program, represented
by a long string of zeros and ones. Id.Source code is the textual code of a program, written in a
programming language, such as C++. Source Code Definition, The Linux Information Project,
http://www.linfo.org/sourcecode. html (last visited Nov. 18, 2008). In the typical order of
computer programming, a programmer writes source code in a programming language and uses a
program, called a compiler, to translate the source code into a string of zeros and ones that the
computer can "understand." Id.Compilation and decompilation create copies of a work. See id.
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order to discern the Genesis' interface specifications.42 Accolade
memorialized this knowledge in an internal development manual and used
it to release several unlicensed games for the Genesis.43 Sega sued for
copyright and trademark infringement, and the district court entered a
preliminary injunction against Accolade."
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "disassembly of copyrighted
object code is, as a matter of law, a fair use of the copyrighted work if such
disassembly provides the only means of access to those elements of the
code that are not protected by copyright and the copier has a legitimate
'
reason for seeking such access."45
The first fair use factor, "purpose and character of the use," favored
Accolade.46 Although Accolade made reproductions of Sega's works for
commercial purposes, it merely sought to discover the unprotected
functional elements of the Genesis system in order to release its own
creative works on a new platform.4 7 The fourth factor, effect on the
market, also favored Accolade.4" Though acknowledging that Accolade's
copying facilitated the release of software that competed with Sega's
software, the court concluded, "it [does not] seem unlikely that a consumer
particularly interested in sports might purchase both Accolade's 'Mike
Ditka Power Football' and Sega's 'Joe Montana Football,' particularly if
the games are, as Accolade contends, not substantially similar."49 The third
factor, amount copied, favored Sega, as Accolade copied entire works.5 °

42. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1516-17. The trademark claims arose from a byproduct of the initialization code.
After locating the TMSS initialization code in the cartridge, the Genesis would automatically
display a startup screen that read, "PRODUCED BY OR UNDER LICENSE FROM SEGA
ENTERPRISES LTD." This function was added to the console to give Sega a cause of action
against Taiwanese pirates, as Taiwan recognizes foreign trademarks but not copyrights. See id. at
1515.
45. Id. at 1518 (emphasis added). The court had first rejected Accolade's other arguments:
(1) intermediate copying does not infringe the reproduction right unless the end product of the
copying infringes the reproduction right; (2) decompilation of object code to understand functional
elements is permissible under the idea and expression dichotomy of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); (3)
disassembly is authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 117, which exempts from copyright scrutiny those copies
made "as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program .... Id. at 1517; 17 U.S.C.
§ 1 17(a)(l) (2008).
46. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1521-22 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)).
47. Id. at 1522. The court also noted the public benefit from increased availability of
independently designed video games. Id. at 1523.
48. Id. at 1522.
49. Id. at 1523.
50. Id. at 1526-27.
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The Ninth Circuit's discussion of the second fair use factor, nature of
the copyrighted work, has the most substantial connection to the DMCA
anti-circumvention provision and reverse engineering.5' Copyright analysis
of computer programs is complicated because programs are intertwined
with copyrightable expression and unprotected functional elements:
To the extent that there are many possible ways of accomplishing
a given task or fulfilling a particular market demand, the
programmer's choice of program structure and design may be
highly creative and idiosyncratic. However, computer programs are,
in essence, utilitarian articles-articles that accomplish tasks. As
such, they contain many logical, structural, and visual display
elements that are dictated by the function to be performed, by
considerations of efficiency, or by external factors such as
compatibility requirements and industry demands.52
Sega's TMSS initialization code was deemed functional, as "[t]here is no
showing that there is a multitude of different ways to unlock the Genesis
LII console. 53 As such, the only code that Accolade directly transcribed
from Sega's software was not protected by copyright.54 The nature of the
work also substantiated Accolade's reverse engineering tactics. Because
a computer program's protected expression is intertwined with unprotected
elements, and because programs are distributed in object code, "humans
often cannot gain access to the unprotected ideas and functional concepts
contained in object code without disassembling that code-i.e., making
copies [of the entire program, including any protected expression]."" If the
court did not find Accolade's copying for reverse engineering purposes to
be a fair use, Sega would have a "de facto monopoly over ...ideas and
functional concepts" without56"satisfy[ing] the more stringent standards
imposed by the patent laws."
Although Atari's console coup was completed a full year before
Accolade began its endeavor to unlock the Genesis, the Federal Circuit
decided Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo ofAmerica, Inc. about one month
after the Ninth Circuit decided Sega.57 The situation was nearly identical.
To recap: Nintendo produced the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES),
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522.
Id. at 1524.
Id.at 1524 n.7 (emphasis added).
Id.at 1525.
Id.(emphasis added).
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527, 1526.
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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a predecessor to Sega's Genesis, and Atari produced software for the
NES.58 Nintendo had a licensing agreement similar to Sega's, and Atari
sought a method of producing unlicensed games for the NES.59 Nintendo
had developed a program, called 1ONES, that "controls access to the NES"
by requiring a computerized "lock" in the console to receive a coded
message from a "key" within the software cartridge before initializing the
game.6"
Atari had less success in reverse engineering the IONES program than
Accolade did with the simpler Genesis lockout mechanisms. Donald
Paauw could not fully analyze the object code by microscopically
examining the chips themselves.61 Atari's engineer, Pat McCarthey, could
not adequately "listen" to the communication between the lock and key
chips to produce an alternative key, and he told Atari's executives to
abandon the project.6' Unfazed, Atari hired a Virginia law firm to defend
it in a copyright infringement suit against Nintendo.63 The only catch: no
such lawsuit had been filed (this suit was not filed for another two years).'
Without bothering to verify that a lawsuit had been filed, the law firm filed
an affidavit with the U.S. Copyright Office, requesting a copy of the
1ONES object code for the purpose of defending the lawsuit.65 Ten days
after Atari and Nintendo had signed their licensing agreement, "[a]n
employee of the law firm headed up to room 402 [of the Copyright Office]
and waltzed out with a copy of the 10NES copyright in his briefcase,"
which he promptly delivered to Atari.66
Perhaps in anticipation of future (non-imagined) litigation, Atari
resumed its efforts to read the source code from the 1ONES chips, using
the ill-gotten copy of the code only to correct errors in this transcription.67
Having quasi-reverse-engineered 1ONES, Atari developed its own
program, called Rabbit, which produced the same coded message as the
58. Id. at 835-36.
59. Id. at 836. Atari, unlike Accolade, had signed a licensing agreement when it could not
successfully reverse engineer the 1ONES program. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also SHEFF, supra note 1, at 247. A computer chip embodies the zeros and ones
of object code through a series of microscopic switches. Basically, the chip has the object code's
string of zeros and ones inscribed onto it. Chip, PC Magazine Encyclopedia,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/0,2542,t=chip&i=39636.asp (last visited Nov. 18,
2008).
62. SHEFF, supra note 1, at 247; Atari, 975 F.2d at 836.
63. SHEFF, supra note 1, at 248.
64. Id. at 248-49.
65. Atari, 975 F.2d at 836.
66. SHEFF, supra note 1, at 248.
67. Id. (The Copyright Office copy facilitated Atari's replication of the 1ONES object code.).
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1ONES key using a different programming language.6" Nintendo sued,
alleging (among other claims) that Atari infringed the 1ONES copyright by
making intermediate copies during the reverse engineering process.69
The Federal Circuit first determined that the IONES did contain protected
expression: "Nintendo incorporated within the IONES program creative
organization and sequencing unnecessary to the lock and key function."7
The Atari court then determined that intermediate copying for reverse
engineering was a fair use.7 ' Rather than mechanically considering the four
factors, like the Sega court did, the Atari court took a broader, rights-based
approach:
Under the [Copyright] Act, society is free to exploit facts, ideas,
processes, or methods of operation in a copyrighted work. To
protect processes or methods of operation, a creator must look to
patent laws. An author cannot acquire patent-like protection by
putting an idea, process, or method of operation in an unintelligible
format and asserting copyright infringement against those who try
to understand that idea, process, or method of operation.72
Two caveats tempered this fair use finding. First, "[t]he fair use
reproductions of a computer program must not exceed what is necessary
to understand the unprotected elements of the work."73 The court did not
elaborate on this point, ostensibly content that Atari had engaged in no
more intermediate copying than was necessary. Second, "[t]o invoke the
fair use exception, an individual must possess an authorized copy of a
literary work," and as such, intermediate copying of the ill-gotten
Copyright Office reproduction was not a fair use.74
Atari's victory was not complete, however. Even if reproductions made
during the process of reverse-engineering were a fair use, reproductions
in the end product of the reverse engineering were not necessarily
68. Atari, 975 F.2d at 836-37 ("The Rabbit gave Atari access to NES owners without
Nintendo's strict license conditions.").
69. Id. at 840, 842.
70. Id. at 840.
71. Id. at 843.
72. Id. at 842 (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,348-50 (1991);
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (additional citations omitted)).
73. Atari, 975 F.2d at 843-44 ("Atari could not use reverse engineering as an excuse to
exploit commercially or otherwise misappropriate protected expression.").
74. Id. at 843. Atari's misrepresentation to the Copyright Office also prevented the court from
considering whether Nintendo was abusing its copyright in the lockout program to monopolize the
unprotected elements of the NES. Because Atari came to the court with unclean hands, it could not
seek equity. Id. at 845-46.
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permissible. Nintendo alleged that Atari's Rabbit program contained
expression that was substantially similar to 1ONES, thereby violating the
reproduction right." The trial court "detected similarities between the
programs beyond [those] ...necessary to embody the unprotectable idea,
process, or method of the 1ONES program," and the Federal Circuit
agreed, citing instructions present in both programs that were unnecessary
for "Atari's stated purpose-unlocking the NES console."7 6 The
superfluous instructions related to tangential functions, such as shutting
down the console if the "key" receives an error message." Atari was still
Rabbit, even if it was somewhat exonerated for its reverse
on the hook 7for
8
engineering.
Eight years later, the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue of reverse
engineering gaming consoles in Sony Computer Entertainment,Inc. v.
Connectix Corp.7 9 Sony, like the two plaintiffs before it, produced a video
game console-the Playstation.8" Unlike Accolade and Atari, however,
Connectix was not a would-be game software producer. Connectix
produced The Virtual Game Station (VGS), a software program for Apple
operating systems that allowed users to play Playstation games on their
Apple computers. 8 '
To produce the VGS, Connectix engineers developed hardware
emulation software that allowed the components of a Macintosh computer,
such as the graphics card, to mimic the components of the Playstation. 2
Connectix then extracted the Playstation's BIOS ("basic input-output
system"), a program that initializes and coordinates the various functions

75. Id.at 840.
76. Id. at 844-45 ("The unnecessary instructions in the Rabbit program suggest copying, not
independent creation."). One wonders whether the outcome would have differed if Atari had stated
its purpose as "imitating the complete functionality of the 1ONES program."
77. Id. at 845.
78. Atari, 975 F.2d at 845. Atari had slightly more success in its countersuit against Nintendo,
which alleged anticompetitive practices. Fueled by American distaste for Japanese businesses, the
suit flourished into an FTC investigation and a lawsuit by the attorneys general of every state. To
chill the accusations of anticompetitive practices, Nintendo abandoned the exclusivity clause of its
licensing agreement and began to loosen its monopoly on the manufacturing process. However,
only top licensees were allowed to manufacture games, they could only do so with chips provided
by Nintendo, and a high royalty was required. The FTC investigation was settled when Nintendo
agreed to send five dollar coupons to five million NES purchasers. Critics scoffed at the settlement,
as the coupons served to boost Nintendo sales and covered only a fraction of the price of any
Nintendo merchandise. See SHEFF, supra note 1, at 256-279.
79. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
80. Id. at 599.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 601.
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of the hardware, from a legally purchased Sony console.8 3 The engineers
then loaded the BIOS onto a computer running the hardware emulation
software and observed the signals sent between the two programs.8 4 The
process required countless reproductions of the copyrighted BIOS.85
Connectix announced its VGS at the 1999 MacWorld Expo, and three
weeks later, Sony sued for, among other causes, copyright infringement.86
Relying heavily on Sega, the Ninth Circuit held that "Connectix's
intermediate copying and use of Sony's copyrighted BIOS was a fair use
for the purpose of gaining access to the unprotected elements of Sony's
software."87 Discussion of the 'nature of the copyrighted work' fair use
factor again focused on the inherently intertwined nature of software and
the resulting need to copy protected expression to access unprotected
elements. Reiterating that "Sega expressly sanctioned disassembly," the
court saw "no reason to distinguish observation of copyrighted software
in an emulated computer environment."88 Although the context was
slightly different, Sony was attempting the same trick as Sega: "If Sony
wishes to obtain a lawful monopoly on the functional concepts in its
software, it must satisfy the more stringent standards of the patent laws."89
Analysis of the 'purpose and character of use' factor was markedly
different than in Sega, as the Supreme Court had, in the interim, endorsed
the transformative use doctrine and rejected the principle that a
commercial use creates a presumption of unfairness.9" By developing its
own original object code and creating a new platform on which to enjoy
Playstation games, the court found the VGS "modestly transformative."'

83. Id.; see also BIOS, PC Magazine Encyclopedia, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_
term/0,2542,t=BIOS&i=38653,00.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
84. Connectix, 203 F.3d at 601.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 603-04.
89. Connectix, 203 F.3d at 605 (citing Bonito, 489 U.S. at 160-61; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526).
90. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 583-84 (1994).
The central purpose of this [factor] is . . . whether the new work merely
"supersede[s] the objects" of the original creation ... or instead adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
extent the new work is "transformative."
Id. at 579 (internal citations omitted).
91. Connectix, 203 F.3d at 606.
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Further, Connectix's use was commercial, but only indirectly so, as no
copying was alleged in the final product.92
The 'effect on the market' factor was handled more directly than in
Sega, and without supposition as to gamers' purchasing habits: "Sony
understandably seeks control over the market for devices that play games
Sony produces or licenses. The copyright law, however, does not confer
such a monopoly."93 Thus, Connectix was the overwhelming victor.94
C. ContractsLimiting the Right to Reverse EngineerAre Either
Preempted by Copyright Law or Constitute Misuse of Copyright
Nor could software companies contractually limit the ability to reverse
engineer during the Sega era, though many companies attempted such a
limitation by including a "shrinkwrap" license with the software.95
Professor Mark Lemley concluded in 1995 that "virtually no reported
decisions have actually enforced shrinkwrap license provisions as written,
especially where those provisions modify federal law." 96
The most frequently cited of these decisions is Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., in which the Fifth Circuit held that federal contract law
preempted state contract law explicitly permitting software vendors to
contractually forbid reverse engineering.97 Vault developed "PROLOK,"
a software program that prevented unauthorized copying of the contents
of floppy disks. 98 The company included "a license agreement with every
PROLOK package that specifically prohibits the copying, modification,
translation, decompilation or disassembly of Vault's program." 99 Quaid
92. id.at 607
93. Id.
94. Sony soon turned to a more direct strategy. Shortly after losing its legal battle, the
company purchased the VGS from Connectix and immediately discontinued the product. A few
years later, Connectix sold its virtual PC application, a Windows emulator for Mac computers, to
Microsoft. Connectix is no longer in business, its employees having either taken positions at
Microsoft or (perhaps) retired to a tropical destination with large checks from Sony and Microsoft.
See Jim Dalrymple, Microsoft Acquires Virtual PCfrom Connectix, MACWORLD, Feb. 19, 2003,
http://www.macworld.com/news/2003/02/19/macbu/.
95. See Mark A. Lemley, IntellectualPropertyandShrinkwrapLicenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1241 (1995). The term "shrinkwrap license" comes from the clear plastic wrapping on the
outside of the software package. Some very early shrinkwrap licenses were affixed to the outside
of the package, such that they could be viewed before opening the package. However, companies
soon began including the license inside the box, so that the license could only be read after
removing the shrinkwrap and opening the package. The ramifications of this modification will be
discussed in Part IV. Id. at 1241-42.
96. Id.at 1259.
97. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
98. Id.at 256.
99. Id.at 257.
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reverse engineered PROLOK to develop a software program that would
create backup copies of programs stored on PROLOK-protected disks. 00
Vault filed suit, "contending that Quaid breached its license agreement."' 0 '
The contract, which the court considered "a contract of adhesion," was
governed by the Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act, which
provides the conditions for creating a binding software license
agreement.0 2 If these conditions are met, the Act then defines the limits of
acceptable contract terms:
Terms of which shall be deemed to have been accepted under R.S.
51:1963, ifincluded in an accompanyinglicense agreementwhich
conforms to the provisions of R.S. 51:1965, may include any or all
of the following:

100. Id.("Quaid copied Vault's program into the memory of its computer and analyzed the
manner in which the program operated.").
101. Id.at 258.
102. Vault, 847 F.2d at 268-69 (quoting Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750,
761 (E.D. La. 1987)). The Louisiana Act, still unchanged since its passage, requires of a license
agreement:
Any person who acquires computer software or a copy thereof shall be
conclusively deemed to have accepted and agreed to all the terms of the license
agreement for such software or copy thereof, including any applicable provisions
contained in [§ 51:1964], if:
(1) A written legend or notice is affixed to or packaged with the software or copy
thereof in such a manner that the legend or notice is clearly and conspicuously
visible upon cursory examination of the software and related packaging; and
(2) The legend or notice is prominently displayed in all capital letters and in
language which is readily understandable to a person of average literacy; and
(3) The legend or notice states clearly that:
(a) Any use of the software or copy thereof will constitute acceptance of the terms
of the accompanying license agreements; or,
(b) Any opening of a sealed package, envelope, or container in which the software
or copy thereof is contained will constitute acceptance of the terms of the
accompanying license agreement; and
(4) The legend or notice states clearly that anyone who receives the software or
a copy thereof and does not accept and agree to the terms of the accompanying
license agreement may, within a reasonable time, return the unused, unopened
software or copy thereof to the party from whom it was acquired, or to some other
identified party, for a full refund of any consideration paid; and
(5) The person acquiring the software or copy thereof takes such action as is stated
in the legend or notice to constitute acceptance of and agreement to the terms of
the accompanying license agreement.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1963 (2007).
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(3) If title to the copy of computer software has been retained by the
licensor, provisions for the prohibition or limitation of rights to
modify and/or adapt the copy of the computer software in any way,
including without limitation prohibitions on translating, reverse
engineering, decompiling, disassembling, and/or creating derivative
works based on the computer software.'0 3
The Fifth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court's guiding principle for the
application of the preemption doctrine: "[w]hen state law touches upon the
area of [patent or copyright statutes], it is 'familiar doctrine' that the
federal policy 'may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied' by the state
law."" It then held, "[t]he provision in Louisiana's License Act, which
permits a software producer to prohibit the adaptation of its licensed
computer program by decompilation or disassembly.., is preempted by
federal law, and thus that the restriction in Vault's license agreement
against decompilation or disassembly is unenforceable.""1 5
The Louisiana statute at issue in Vault is often misquoted. It is not, as
the Federal Circuit has claimed, "a state law prohibiting all copying [or
reverse engineering] of a computer program."'" Louisiana's license act is
a regulation of contracts, setting the guidelines and boundaries of contracts
between two parties. The Louisiana law does not create any society-wide
prohibitions; it merely clarifies the extent to which parties may bind each
other in software licenses. The Fifth Circuit's holding, then, states that no
contract may incorporate the provision deemed acceptable-but-optional by
the Louisiana License Act.
Two years later, the Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion with
a different doctrine in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds. 7 Both sides
of this dispute manufactured devices used to cut cardboard so that it could
be folded into boxes.'08 Lasercomb developed a software program, entitled
Interact, to aid in this manufacturing endeavor and licensed four prerelease
copies to defendant's company. 9 The license agreement forbade licensees
103. Vault, 847 F.2d at 269 n.28 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964 (2008)) (emphasis
added). Section 51.1964, which is still on the books, also contains a provision allowing the licensor
to prohibit any and all copying. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964(2).
104. Vault, 847 F.2d at 269 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,229
(1964)) (bracketed text in original).
105. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
106. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Vault, 847
F.2d at 268-69).
107. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
108. Id. at971.
109. Id.
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from "writ[ing], develop[ing], produc[ing], or sell[ing]" competing
software."' Defendants made unauthorized copies of Lasercomb's
software, and they developed and marketed "a software program... which
was almost entirely a direct copy of Interact.""' Lasercomb sued, and
defendants made the affirmative defense of copyright misuse." 2
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by noting the uncertain status of
the copyright misuse defense: "Although the patent misuse defense has
been generally recognized since Morton Salt, it has been much less certain
whether an analogous copyright misuse defense exists.... The few courts
considering the issue have split on whether the defense should be
recognized.""' After establishing that the public policy interests behind
patent and copyright laws are analogous, the court determined that the
reasoning behind the adoption of the patent misuse doctrine applied
equally well in the copyright context. 1' The court held that such a defense
should apply to copyrights, interjecting copyright terminology into a
famous passage from Morton Salt:
The grant to the [author] of the special privilege of a [copyright]
carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to [Authors]... the exclusive
Right.. ." to their ["original" works]. But the public policy which
includes [original works] within the granted monopoly... forbids
the use of the [copyright] to secure an exclusive right or limited
monopoly not granted by the [Copyright] Office and which it is
contrary to public policy to grant." 5
Having determined that such a defense is available to the defendants, the
Fourth Circuit found that Lasercomb had misused its copyright: "Its
standard licensing agreement... attempts to suppress any attempt by the
'
licensee to independently implement the idea which Interact expresses. 116
As the Fourth Circuit explained further, "[t]he misuse arises from
110. Id. at 973 ("Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1) year after
the termination of this Agreement, that it will not write, develop, produce or sell or assist others in
the writing, developing, producing, or selling computer assisted die making software .....
111. Id. at971.
112. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973.
113. Id. at 976 (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (upholding
the patent misuse doctrine); W. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 4.09
(1989)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 977 (quoting Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
116. Id.at 978.
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Lasercomb's attempt to use its copyright in a particular expression, the
Interact software, to control competition in an area outside the copyright,
i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die manufacture."' 17
Il. THE MODERN LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF REVERSE ENGINEERING

A. The DMCA
Ten months after the Connectix decision was published, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) went into effect."' The sections of
the DMCA relevant to this analysis were enacted to provide copyright
holders with additional protections against piracy seen as necessary in the
digital age, where perfect copies of copyrighted works could be
effortlessly and infinitely disseminated." 9 Legal support for electronic
copyright protections was a prerequisite for copyright holders to offer their
works in digital form and in Internet marketplaces.120
To this end, the DMCA states that "[n]o person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under [the Copyright Act]."' 2 Trafficking in devices that facilitate
circumvention is also prohibited:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof, that(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act];
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act]; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a
117. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
118. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West 2007).
119. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) ("Due to the ease with which digital works can be
copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make
their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be
protected against massive piracy.").
120. Id.(predicting that the DMCA would "launch[] the global digital on-line marketplace for
copyrighted works... [and] facilitate making available quickly and conveniently via the Internet
the movies, music, software, and literary works that are the fruit of American creative genius.").
121. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2007).
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technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under [the Copyright Act]. 22
"Circumventing a technological measure" is defined as "to descramble a
scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid,
bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the
authority of the copyright owner," and "a technological measure
'effectively controls access to a work' if the measure, in the ordinary
course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a
process or a treatment,
with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain
123
work.,
the
to
access
The DMCA includes several exceptions, one of which directly pertains
to this discussion of reverse engineering:
(1)Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person
who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer
program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a particular portion of that program for the sole
purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program
that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently
created computer program with other programs, and that have not
previously been readily available to the person engaging in the
circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification and
analysis do not constitute infringement under this title.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "interoperability"
means the ability of computer programs to exchange information,
and of such programs mutually to use the information which has
been exchanged. 24
The Senate Report corresponding to this subsection explicitly states that
the reverse engineering sanctioned by the Sega line of cases was to remain
lawful:
The objective the DMCA's exception provisions is to ensure that
the effect of current case law interpreting the Copyright Act is not
changed by enactment of this legislation for certain acts of
122. Id.§ 1201(a)(2).
123. Id.§ 1201(a)(3).
124. Id.at § 1201(f); see also S.REP. No. 105-190, at 33 (1998) ("tools that programmers use
in developing computer programs, such as compilers, trace analyzers and disassemblers... are not
prohibited by this section.").
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identification and analysis done in respect of computer programs.
[sic] See, Sega EnterprisesLtd. vAccolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1992.). The purpose of this section is to
foster competition
and innovation in the computer and software
125
industry.

B. How the DMCA Affects Reverse Engineering
Despite the assurances of the Senate Report, the post-DMCA ability to
reverse engineer is weaker than in the Sega era. First, the DMCA is much
more restrictive in defining the circumstances under which software
reverse engineering is acceptable. Under Sega, reverse engineering is
permissible when (1) it is necessary to access unprotected information
within a computer program and (2) the reverse engineers have a legitimate
purpose. 126 Under the DMCA, which applies whenever efforts to reverse
engineer require the circumvention of an access control mechanism,
reverse engineers may only (1) identify and analyze (2) elements related
to program-to-program interoperability (3) for the purpose of achieving
interoperability (4) without committing copyright infringement while
identifying and analyzing. 127 Instead of having the ability to reverse
engineer for any legitimate purpose, programmers in the DMCA world
may reverse engineer only in order to make their programs work with
other programs ("interoperability").
The narrowed window of acceptable purposes is burdensome for
innovation industries (except, of course, those parties that have already
innovated). Accolade, Atari, and Connectix would arguably be safe under
§ 1201(f). Their reverse engineering efforts were dedicated solely to
making their software interoperate with the software of Sega, Nintendo,
and Sony. 128 Of course, Sega and Nintendo might argue that plaintiffs were
attempting software-to-hardware interoperability, which may or may not
be included in the safe harbor for program-to-program interoperability.
Further, imagine that Google had reverse engineered AltaVista's web
crawler in order to develop its world-beating search engine. If AltaVista's
code were protected by technological access control measures, then
Google would have violated the DMCA, as the purpose of its reverse
engineering was innovation, as opposed to interoperability. Under Sega,
on the other hand, Google would be free to learn as much as possible from
125. S.REP.No. 105-190, at 13 (1998).
126. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992).

127. 17 U.S.C. § 1201() (2007). These numbers are for parsing purposes only and do not
reflect any enumeration in the actual statutory text.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 59, 81.
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AltaVista's programs, as long as Google's ultimate program did not
merely copy code from AltaVista. 2 9
Second, reverse engineering tools are more likely to be outlawed by the
DMCA by requiring courts to scrutinize an individual component or part
of a device.13 ° Under contributory infringement, the doctrine that controls
the legality of such devices in the non-DMCA world, it is an open question
whether a court should analyze the product-as-a-whole or individual
components of that device. The seminal case on contributory infringement,
Sony v. Universal City Studios, declares that a device does not violate the
copyright of others "if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes[,]" or, in other words, if it is "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses."''
This Supreme Court instruction refers to the product-as-a-whole and
makes no mention of analyzing individual components. On the other hand,
the Sony Court analyzed only the 'record' function of the Betamax in
determining whether the Betamax machine contributorily infringed the
reproduction right of television content owners by allowing Betamax users
to record television programs. 3 2 One could argue that the Supreme Court
was implicitly approving an individual function analysis, because the
Betamax had a much less complicated non-infringing use: watching
' This flexibility allows
purchased, rented, or camcorder-recorded movies. 33
courts to apply a "sniff test," condemning a blatantly infringing device
duct taped to a non-infringing device but exculpating a device primarily
designed for non-infringing purposes that has, by necessity, an infringing
component.
Consider, for example, a computer program that allows users to analyze
and manipulate other pieces of software that are access-protected by
technological measures. By necessity, this program has a function to
circumnavigate technological measures, such as decrypting encrypted
software. The program, assume further, consists primarily of functions that
assist engineers in performing the type of activities undertaken by the Sega
plaintiffs-perhaps the ability to log messages sent between programs or
hardware components, a decompiler, or a code debugger.
129. See supra text accompanying note 47.
130. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2007).
131. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (emphasis
added).
132. Id. at 422-23, 442.
133. Twentieth-Century Fox began releasing home videos in 1975. See The Museum of
Broadcast Communications, Home Video, available at http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/HI
htmlH/homevideo/homevideo.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2008); Total Rewind, Format War,
http://www.totalrewind.org/fmtwar.htm.
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Without the DMCA, a software company could sue the designer of this
program for contributory infringement, but a court would apply the more
flexible Sony rule and potentially view the program-as-a-whole for
substantial non-infringing uses. 3" This program has non-infringing uses
that are arguably "substantial," as a programmer might use it on her own
independently-written software during the development and debugging
stages of production. Under Sega, the programmer could also use the
program on the software of anotherparty for legitimate, fair-use reverseengineering. 35
Under the DMCA, however, the reverse-engineering program is almost
certainly doomed. Despite its many non-infringing uses, the statute obliges
a court to ask whether the program has a "component[] or part" that "is
primarily designed... for the purpose of circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work."' 36 The component of
this program that unlocks access-protected software is undoubtedly
designed to circumvent technological measures. At the very least, a court
would require the program's designers to remove the circumvention
function, an injunction that would weaken the ability to reverse-engineer
in an increasingly access-controlled world.
C. Recent Decisions in ContractLaw
A software license with an anti-reverse-engineering provision, similar
to those in Vault and Lasercomb, was upheld in Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies, Inc., highlighting a potential shift in courts' views on the
interaction between copyright and contract laws. 7 Bowers produced an
add-on template for CAD software.' 38 His template program included a
shrink-wrap license that "prohibited, inter alia, all reverse engineering of
[the] software, protection encompassing but more extensive than copyright protection, which prohibits only certain copying."' 39 Baystate, having
purchased a copy of Bowers' program, designed a program that
incorporated many of its features. 4 ' Bowers sued for, among other claims,
breach of contract, and Baystate defended on the grounds that "the
Copyright Act preempts the prohibition of reverse engineering embodied
in Mr. Bowers' shrink-wrap license agreements."''
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 110, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1320-21.
Id.at 1327.
Id.at 1322.
Id.at 1323.
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The Federal Circuit analyzed the claim based on the principle that no
preemption has occurred under the Copyright Act if "'a state cause of
action requires an extra element, beyond mere copying, preparation of
derivative works, performance, distribution or display."" 42 The Federal
Circuit acknowledged that "'not every "extra element" of a state law claim
will establish a qualitative variance between the rights protected by federal
copyright law and those protected by state law."",143 Noting that "most
courts to examine this issue have found that the Copyright Act does not
preempt contractual constraints on copyrighted articles," the Federal
Circuit held that the contract elements of assent and consideration were
extra elements that foreclosed preemption."
The Federal Circuit also noted that its decision did not affect its
holding in Atari or the reverse engineering exception of the DMCA, §
1201 (f). 4 1It then distinguished its holding from Vault: "Moreover, while
the Fifth Circuit has held a state law prohibiting all copying of a computer
program is preempted by the Federal Copyright Act, no evidence suggests
the First Circuit would extend this concept to include private contractual
agreements supported by mutual assent and consideration."'"
Judge Dyk dissented. He argued that the test for copyright preemption
should match the test for patent preemption: "whether the state law
'substantially impedes the public use of the otherwise unprotected'
material."' 47 Using this test, Judge Dyk found that copyright holders were
using state contract law to eliminate a fair use defense that is necessary to
prevent authors from gaining protection over unprotectable ideas.'48
Next, Dyk argued that Bowers' contract failed the "extra element" test
employed by the majority.'4 9 While a fully-negotiated contract might limit
fair use without being preempted by Copyright law, a shrink-wrap license
is an adhesion contract, giving "the copyright holder the ability to

142. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36
F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994)) (citation omitted).
143. Id. (quoting DataGen., 36 F.3d at 1164) ("For example, the First Circuit observed that
'a state law misappropriation claim will not escape preemption... simply because a plaintiff must
prove that copying was not only unauthorized but also commercially immoral."' (quoting Data
Gen., 36 F.3d at 1165)).
144. Id. at 1324-25.
145. Id. at 1325.
146. Id. (citing Vault, 847 F.2d at 255).
147. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1335 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 157 (1989); citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964))
(Dyk, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1336 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
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eliminate the fair use defense in each and every instance at its option."' 50
He likened the use of state contract law in this respect to a hypothetical
"black dot" law: "If state law provided that a copyright holder could bar
fair use of the copyrighted material by placing a black dot on each copy of
the work offered for sale, there would be no question but that the state law
would be preempted."''
Dyk pointed out that the majority had substantially misread Vault:
the Fifth Circuit held that the specific provision of state law that
authorized contracts prohibiting reverse engineering,
decompilation, or disassembly of computer programs was
preempted by federal law because it conflicted with a portion of the
Copyright Act and because it "'touched upon an area' of federal
copyright law." From a preemption standpoint, there is no
distinction between a state law that explicitly validates a contract
that restricts reverse engineering (Vault) and general common law
that permits such a restriction (as here).' 52
Dyk distinguished the cases relied upon by the majority in that the cases
upheld contract terms that did not restrict a right under the copyright
law.'53 For instance, in ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg,which, at the time, was
the only other court of appeals decision regarding shrinkwrap licenses, the
software developer sold non-commercial and commercial versions of its
software. 5 4 The non-commercial version, which was offered at a reduced
price, had a "no commercial use" restriction in its shrinkwrap license."'
As opposed to the reverse-engineering prohibition in his case, Dyk found
this contract term acceptable under preemption doctrine: "The Copyright
Act does not confer a right to pay the same amount for commercial and
personal use. It does, however, confer a right to fair use, which we have
held encompasses reverse engineering." ' 56

150. Id. at 1337 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1336-37 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
152. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1337 (quoting Vault, 847 F.2d at 269-70 (quoting Sears, Roebuck,
376 U.S. at 229)) (Dyk, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Dyk, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1337 (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)) (Dyk, J.,
dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1338 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107) (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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D. Reverse EngineeringTakes a Step Back
Curtailments of reverse-engineering abilities in both contract and
copyright doctrine came to a head in Davidson & Associates, Inc. v.
Internet Gateway, Inc. (also known as "bnetd'). Bnetd offers a perfect
opportunity to view the shifting legal landscape because it pits a successful
video game company (Blizzard Entertainment) against a producer of
interoperating software, just as in Sega,Nintendo, and Connectix. Blizzard
produces extremely popular computer games, including the WarCraft,
StarCraft, and Diablo series.157 In January 1997, Blizzard launched
Battle.net, a free online service that allows gainers to play alongside or
against each other in certain Blizzard titles."' Many users were
disappointed by system bugs, unscrupulous players who cursed or cheated,
and the apparently unconscionable quid-pro-quo of having to view small
advertisements in order to use the free service.159 Led by Ross Combs, Rob
Crittenden, and Jim Jung, a loose alliance of programmers formed the
"bnetd project" to develop an alternative method of playing multiplayer
Blizzard games over the internet. 16 °
To create the bnetd service, the programmers needed to learn the
"language" that Blizzard software spoke to the Battle.net service. 6 '
Without this language, called "protocol" in programming parlance, the
bnetd service could not communicate with the end-users' software, and the
multiplayer system could not function.' 62 The programmers, by necessity,
performed reverse engineering operations to learn the protocol:
Combs used reverse engineering in the process of developing the
bnetd server, including a program called "tcpdump" to log
communications between Blizzard games and the Battle.net server.
Crittenden used reverse engineering in the process of developing
the bnetd server, including using a program called "Nextray."
Crittenden also used a program called "ripper" to take Blizzard
together in one file and break them
client files which were compiled
63
into their component parts. 1
157. See Blizzard Entm't Web Site, http://www.blizzard.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
158. Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (E.D. Mo.
2004), affd, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Battle.net Introduction, http://www.battle.
net/intro.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
159. Davidson, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1171-72.
160. Id. at 1172 ("The bnetd program was intended as a functional alternative to the Battle.net
service.").
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.at 1172-73.
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Even Blizzard, through its expert report, acknowledged that the protocol
language required for a multiplayer server could not be learned another
way."4 The programmers reverse engineered legally acquired versions of
Blizzard software, which, when installed, required users to accept the
following End User License Agreement and Terms of Use:
BY INSTALLING, COPYING, OR OTHERWISE USING THE
SOFTWARE PROGRAM YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE
TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT.
[S]ubject to the grant of license hereinabove, you may not, in whole
or in part, copy, photocopy, reproduce, translate, reverse engineer,
derive source code, modify, disassemble, decompile, create
derivative works based on the Program, or remove any proprietary
notices or labels on the program without the prior consent, in
writing, of Blizzard.
You are entitled to use Battle.net for your own personal use, but
you shall not be entitled to... (ii) copy, photocopy, reproduce,
translate, reverse engineer, modify, disassemble, or de-compile in
whole or in part any Battle.net software; (iii) create derivative
works based on Battle.net; (iv) host or provide matchmaking
services for any Blizzard software programs or emulate or redirect
the communicationprotocols used by Blizzard as part of Battle.net,
through protocol emulation, runneling, modifying, or adding
components to the Program, use of a utility program, or any other
technique now known or hereafter developed for any purpose ... .65
Such licensing agreements are a recent development in the realm of
gaming software. Diablo, the oldest title at issue in the suit, lacked an
agreement, and no mention of similar terms is found in the published
opinions of Sega, Nintendo, or Connectix.166
One important feature of Battle.net that bnetd lacked was CD key
authentication.' 67 All Blizzard software after Diablo includes a CD key, a
unique string of alphanumerics (generally printed on the jewel case

164. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Davidson, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (No.
4:02CV498 (AS)), 2003 WL 243 09750.
165. Davidson, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 1182 n. 13. The author has also examined his personal collection of video games
produced during the 1980s and 1990s and found no end user license agreements.
167. Id.at 1173.
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holding the game media) that the user must enter to install the game. 68 In
an attempt to curb piracy, Blizzard created an authentication process to
restrict access to Battle.net' 69 Each time a user logs onto Battle.net, the
user's CD key is encrypted and transmitted to Battle.net, where the service
authenticates that the CD key is valid and not being used by another active
Battle.net participant. 7 ' The bnetd server, on the other hand, received the
encrypted key but performed no authentication process, simply sending
back the "authentication successful" message necessary for the software
to initialize online play. 7 ' The bnetd developers offered to implement
functions that would prevent users from playing on bnetd with pirated
copies, but Blizzard refused, ostensibly wanting to maintain the
confidentiality of its data pertaining to CD keys.'72 Instead, Blizzard filed
suit, alleging (among other claims) copyright infringement, violation of the
DMCA, and breach of the End User License Agreements (EULA) and
Battle.net Terms of Use (TOU).' 7 3
Having settled the copyright infringement claim, Blizzard alleged that
the bnetd programmers breached the EULA and TOU by reverse
engineering Blizzard's software. 7 4 The defendants argued that these
contracts were unenforceable because they prohibited a well-established
fair use.'75 Thus, the issue of reverse engineering was entirely contractual,
and the district court resolved the matter with only a passing reference to
Connectix and no discussion of the Sega doctrine.' 7 6 Despite
acknowledging that "[r]everse engineering was necessary in order for the
defendants to learn Blizzard's protocol language and to ensure that bnetd
worked with Blizzard games" and that "[ilt would not have been possible
to create a workable bnetd server without reverse engineering Blizzard's
software and protocols[,]" the district court found the contractual
agreement to be determinative. 77
' The district court gave a brief overview
of Vault and Bowers and, without explanation, concluded, "[t]he Court
'
finds the reasoning in Bowers persuasive." 178
It then held, "[t]he

168. Id. at 1169.
169. Id.
170. Davidson, 334 F. Supp. at 1169.
171. Id. at 1173.
172. Cindy Cohn, EFF Letter to Blizzard/Vivendi, availableat http://www.eff.org/pages/effletter-blizzard-vivendi (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
173. Davidson, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
174. Id.at 1174.
175. Id.at 1180.
176. Id,
177. Id.at 1172.
178. Davidson, 334 F. Supp. at 1180-81.
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defendants in this case waived their 'fair use' right to reverse engineer by
agreeing to the licensing agreement."' 79
Blizzard next alleged that the bnetd programmers violated the DMCA
by circumventing the CD key system, a technological measure that
controls access to Battle.net mode. 8 The programmers argued that 17
U.S.C. § 1201(0(1) protects their circumvention, as it was done "for the
sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program
that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs. . . ." ' This exception is only
available "to the extent any such acts of identification and analysis do not
constitute infringement under this title."' 8 2 The district court quickly
established that the bnetd team had "extended into the realm of copyright
infringement" based on the following: (1) bnetd lacked CD key
authentication, (2) "[u]nauthorized copies of the Blizzard games were
played on bnetd servers," (3) bnetd was free, (4) bnetd was open source,
(5) bnetd was distributed in binary form (as opposed to uncompiled source
code), and (6) bnetd performs the same function as battle.net' 83 Based on
these facts, the district court found the bnetd programmers liable for
circumvention and trafficking a circumvention device.'84
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the contractual waiver of the bnetd
programmers' fair use defense and the inapplicability of the DMCA's
interoperability exception.'85 On the contract issue, the court first
distinguished Vault: "the state law at issue here ... [does not] restrict[ ]
rights given under federal law."' 8 6 Quoting Judge Dyk's dissent in Bowers,
the appeals court determined that the bnetd programmers had "expressly
relinquished their rights to reverse engineer" by entering into a "freely
negotiated" contract."' its reasoning for the inapplicability of the
interoperability exception closely paralleled that of the district court:
"Appellants's circumvention in this case constitutes infringement.... [a]s
a result [of the bnetd project], unauthorized copies of the Blizzard games
were freely played on bnetd.org servers."188

179. Id.at 1181.
180. 1d.at 1183.
181. Id. at 1184 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0(1)).
182. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0(1)).
183. Davidson, 334 F. Supp. at 1185.
184. Id. at 1185-87.
185. Id. at 642.
186. Id. at639.
187. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dyk,
J., dissenting)).
188. Davidson, 334 F. Supp. at 642.
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OF BOWERS AND BNETD

From both doctrinal and policy perspectives, the recent curtailment of
the Sega era freedom to reverse engineer is questionable. Doctrinally, the
Bowers and bnetd decisions misinterpret statutes and prior case law.
A. ContractualBurdens
Although the bnetd courts do not misquote Vault as blatantly as the
Federal Circuit in Bowers, all of these courts were heavily influenced by
the fact that the Louisiana license act (in Vault) does explicitly what
contractual common law (in Bowers and bnetd) does implicitly. In bnetd,
the Eighth Circuit interpreted the state law at issue in Vault as restricting
rights granted under federal law while determining that general contract
law does not restrict such rights.189 The Federal Circuit determined that the
licensing regulation at issue in Vault was nothing less than "a state law
prohibiting all copying of a computer program... ."O However, none of
the state laws at issue in Vault, Bowers, or bnetd directly restrict rights
granted under federal law. Rather, they allow private parties to restrict
other private parties' rights granted under federal law. The law at issue in
Vault was no more a state-wide prohibition on reverse engineering than a
common law contract doctrine stating that 'parties may bind each other to
agreements.' Still, the Vault court invalidated the no-reverse-engineering
clause because the law was being used to restrict rights granted under
copyright law. Similarly, the common law doctrine that 'parties may bind
each other to agreements' was used in Bowers and bnetd to restrict rights
granted under federal law.
If Vault had relied on Louisiana's general contract law instead of a
specific software licensing statute, the Bowers and bnetd courts probably
would have deemed it persuasive authority. In this regard, they have
created a distinction without a difference, as the Vault court correctly
recognized that it was dealing with a contract provision and not a state" ' Thus, it would almost assuredly have
wide ban.19
reached the same
holding without the presence of the licensing statute. By distinguishing
189. Id. at 639 ("Unlike in Vault, the state law at issue here... [does not] restrict[ ] rights
given under federal law.").
190. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325.
191. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,268-69 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Louisiana's
License Act permits a software producer to impose a number of contractual terms upon software
purchasers provided that the terms are set forth in a license agreement which comports with La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:1963 & 1965 ...Enforceable terms include the prohibition of... reverse
engineering, decompilation or disassembly.") (emphasis added).
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Vault on the grounds that its law directly impedes copyright law by
imposing a state-wide ban, the Bowers and bnetd courts failed to
adequately analyze the defendants' arguments.
Judge Dyk would be horrified to learn that his dissent in Bowers was
cited as support for the bnetd holding. Dyk proposed that courts permit
parties to waive their fair use rights in contracts that are "freely
negotiated.""19 The contract in bnetd, like the contract in Bowers, was
anything but freely negotiated. The bnetd programmers first learned the
terms of the license agreement after purchasing the software and inserting
the game disks into their computers. 93 The license agreement was not
"negotiated" in any sense of the term, as the programmers had no input
regarding the terms of the contract. Instead, the programmers had but two
choices: accept all of Blizzard's terms or return the software for a
refund. 9 4 Of course, almost no retail store allows customers to return
opened software, and returning the software to Blizzard could take
weeks.1 95 Nevertheless, this level of bargaining strength was sufficient for
the Eighth Circuit to determine that the bnetd programmers had "freely
negotiated" their licenses with Blizzard. 96
B. DMCA Burdens
The bnetd district and appeals courts seriously mishandled their
analysis of § 1201(f), the reverse engineering exception to the anticircumvention provision. A court should only bar defendants from
if the "acts of identification and analysis" infringe the
invoking § 1201 (f)
copyright of another.'97 In bnetd, the courts focused on the result of the
acts of identification and analysis by determining that the bnetd emulator
itself infringed Blizzard's copyrights.' 98 The district court opinion makes
only a passing reference to the various tools and methods employed by the
programmers, and it completely foregoes any analysis of whether the
programmers' actions in learning Blizzard protocols would constitute

192. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
193. Davidson, 422 F.3d at 633 n.2.
194. Id. at 634 n.4.
195. See Store Return Policy, bestbuy.com, available at http://www.bestbuy.com/ (follow
"Customer Service" link at top; then follow "Returns" link; then follow "Store Return Policy" link)
(last visited Oct. 21, 2008) ("Opened computer software, movies, music and video games can be
exchanged for the identical item but cannot be returned for a refund.").
196. Davidson, 422 F.3d at 639.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
198. Davidson, 422 F.3d at 640.
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infringement. The Eighth Circuit followed suit by focusing on the bnetd
emulator instead of the acts undertaken to develop the emulator.'99
The applicability of § 1201 (f) should have turned on an analysis of the
methods and tools used by the bnetd programmers. The bnetd team
employed two of the most common methods for protocol analysis, neither
of which is likely to result in copyright infringement. First, the bnetd
programmers decompiled Blizzard's games to analyze these protocol
messages sent by the games to the Battle.net servers. 200 This method,
which parallels the actions of Accolade and Atari, is expressly sanctioned
by the Sega doctrine.20 ' Second, the bnetd programmers used programs
that "listen" to the information transmitted between Blizzard's games and
its Battle.net system.20 2 This method is analogous to learning a foreign
language by listening to two individuals speaking the language. 0 3
Even if the courts were supposed to determine whether the bnetd
program infringed Blizzard's copyright for purposes of the § 1201(f)
exception, their analysis was lackluster. The infringement portion of the
district court opinion lacks a single reference to 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-107 or
the substantial similarity doctrine, which are hallmarks of direct
infringement analysis. Instead, the Eighth Circuit noted that, among other
facts, bnetd was free and distributed in binary code. 2" If these factors are
critical to a determination of copyright infringement, then every piece of
software in the world is likely to violate the Copyright Act, as the Eastern
District of Missouri will be hard-pressed to locate an end-user program
that is not distributed in binary code. The Eighth Circuit, perhaps
attempting to establish some cursory form of secondary infringement,
noted that pirated copies of Blizzard games were played using the bnetd
emulator.20 5 While these facts may help the court establish that "[t]he
defendants' purpose in developing the bnetd server was to avoid the anticircumvention restrictions of the game and to avoid the restricted access
to Battle.net," they are completely out of place in an analysis of whether
the bnetd program infringed any copyrights. 2 6 The courts may have been
attempting to nullify the Sega doctrine by establishing an illegitimate
purpose behind the reverse engineering, but neither opinion expresses this
line of reasoning or cites to Sega.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
2004).
205.
206.

Id.
Id. at 642.
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 110, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
Davidson, 422 F.3d at 636.
Thanks to Fred von Lohmann for this analogy.
Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1185 (E.D. Mo.
Davidson, 422 F.3d at 642.
Davidson, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
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The bnetd emulator may well have infringed Blizzard's copyright (or
materially contributed to other infringements). However, this situation was
delineated more properly by the Federal Circuit in Atari, which held the
defendants liable for the Rabbit program but not for any permissible acts
of reverse engineering they employed in developing the Rabbit." 7
IV. SHOULD SOCIETY PREFER THE SEGA ERA OR THE CURRENT
STATE OF THE LAW?

A. An EmpiricalImpossibility
Determining the "appropriate" level of freedom to reverse engineer is
an impossible endeavor. The first step, selecting criteria on which to assess
"appropriateness," is not difficult, as the U.S. Constitution provides
helpful guidance. The second step, measuring the effects of a policy choice
using the selected criteria, is infinitely harder. After detailing the most
influential attempt to measure the effects ofpolicy choices, this article will
argue that we have shifted too far in the restrictive direction by discussing
"warning signs" instead of engaging in any sort of measurement.
The Framers of the Constitution set forth the guiding principle for
intellectual property law when they permitted Congress to pass copyright
and patent laws "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts[.]'2 8 Thus, an intellectual property doctrine's effect on the "Progress
of Science and useful Arts," which this Article refers to as "innovation,"
measures the appropriateness of the doctrine. A law that promotes
innovation is favored over one that stifles innovation.
However, "innovation" is worthless unless society benefits from it.
Thus, the endeavor to select an appropriate level of intellectual property
protection, including the freedom to reverse engineer, runs into an
intractable dilemma: "without monopoly protection, not enough
intellectual property will be developed, but, with a legal monopoly, too
little will be used."2 9 Society is better off if everyone benefits from
inventions and artistic works, but unless inventors and artists are able to
reap adequate returns for their efforts, society will not receive these
developments in the first place. Because the law cannot pull a "bait and
207. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844-45 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
8.
208. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.
209. Lawrence D. Graham & Richard 0. Zerbe, Economically Efficient Treatment of
Computer Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection, andDisclosure, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 61, 71 (1996) (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 37-41
(1988)).
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switch" on inventors and artists (e.g., promising extensive protection
before the moment of creation, and then, delivering no protection after
creation), it must provide just enough protection to incentivize creation
without preventing society from making adequate use of the creation.210
This dilemma is particularly nefarious in the context of reverse
engineering because innovation is on both sides of the equation. Society
hopes to incentivize "first-level" innovators with intellectual property
protections, but in doing so through reverse engineering prohibitions, it
decreases "second-level" innovation. 21' To take an earlier example, society
wants AltaVista to create its search engine, but it also wants Google to
improve upon AltaVista's design. Keep this dilemma in mind while
considering the costs and benefits of reverse engineering.
B. The Costs andBenefits of Reverse Engineering,in General
Reverse engineering has untold value to society, especially in the
computer industry. First, reverse engineering increases the speed with
which technology advances by allowing second-level innovators to build
upon proprietary first-level innovations, a process known as sequential (or
incremental) innovation. Second, reverse engineering strengthens the
computer industry by increasing the number of interoperable programs.
Each new program that interoperates with an existing program makes that
existing program more valuable, a benefit known as "network effects."
Sequential innovation and network efforts are particularly important in
the software industry, where "innovation typically proceeds via a mix of
new coding, modifications to some existing modules and subroutines, and
either literal or functional reuse of others" and "patterns of improvements
are constrained to a substantial degree by the need to preserve

210. Neil Winstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
285.
Copyright law strikes a precarious balance. To encourage authors to create and
disseminate original expression, it accords them a bundle of proprietary rights in
their works. But to promote public education and creative exchange, it invites
audiences and subsequent authors to use existing works in every conceivable
manner that falls outside the province of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.
Copyright law's perennial dilemma is to determine where exclusive rights should
end and unrestrained public access should begin.
Id.
211. And, of course, "third-level" innovation, "fourth-level" innovation, and beyond. In this
Article, I will refer only to two iterations of innovation.
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interoperability between program, system, and network components.
In the patent context, Professors Cohen and Lemley cite these benefits in
arguing for a limited right to reverse engineer patented software and a
more restrictive application of the doctrine of equivalents in patent
infringement suits.213 These benefits are equally applicable in a
determination of the proper level of reverse engineering copyrighted
software.
The dawn of the personal computer revolution highlights the value of
both sequential innovation and network effects. First-level innovator IBM
released the first personal computer on August 12, 1981 .214 IBM protected
its proprietary BIOS code as a copyrighted work, and as a result, the PC
market was fragmented by "clones," which were not completely
compatible with software written for MS-DOS/IBM systems:
A good PC knockoff running DOS might be able to mimic the IBM
99 percent of the time, but that other 1 percent would be left as a
seed of doubt in the minds of corporate managers, who could be
counted on to remember
the old saying, "Nobody was ever fired for
215
buying IBM."
Along came a group of reverse-engineers from Texas working for a thenunknown startup named Compaq.21 6 Over the course of fifteen months
(and at a cost of one million dollars), one group of engineers developed an
incredibly detailed catalog of the various functions performed by the IBM
BIOS. 217 A second team, which had never seen the code for the IBM
BIOS, then wrote its own independent BIOS based on the first team's
specifications. 218 The result of these efforts was the first 100% IBMcompatible personal computer that did not infringe the copyright of IBM's
BIOS.2 19 Compaq's computer was itself innovative, as it was the first

212. Julie Cohen & Mark Lemley, PatentScope andInnovation in the Software Industry, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2001) ("Software innovation is by nature largely incremental. It is rare for
programs to be rewritten entirely from scratch ....
213. Id.
214. Jim Battley, Big Blue Birthday: IBM Turns 20, CNN.com, http://archives.cnn.com/
200 1/TECH/ptech/08/1O/IBM.open.arch.idg/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
215. Revenge of the BIOS, Startup Gallery, http://www.startupgallery.org/gallery/story.
php?ii=57 (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 215-18.
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"portable" PC-a twenty-eight pound precursor to the modem laptop. 22 1
Also, it shifted the personal computer industry from one of fragmentation
to one of phenomenal "network effects." The "100% IBM-Compatible"
market (as opposed to the "clone" market) benefited from software and
hardware that could work with any system, a reduced need for innovations
to be repeated in distinct markets, and a more fertile environment for
sequential innovation.
On the other hand, first-level innovation is negatively affected by
reverse engineering. The incentive to develop innovative new products is
lowered when reverse engineers can quickly produce competing products.
The boat hull designs discussed earlier are a perfect example: few would
invest large sums of money and time crafting an innovative boat hull
without reasonable expectations of an adequate return, and this return is
weakened when an innovation can be immediately and effortlessly
copied.221
Also, reverse engineering is often a costly and complicated process that
drains resources from other potentially innovative research. When a
product is reverse engineered for educational purposes, this cost is
minimized, as the process itself is valuable to the engineer. However,
when the engineer seeks only to make a competing product, she is
spending resources to recreate an innovation that already exists. If this
competing product is not independently innovative, then no "progress in
the useful arts" has occurred, though society may benefit from increased
access to the innovation.
C. An Attempt to Balance the Scales
With these costs and benefits to innovation in mind, anybody may
attempt to "read the scales," that is, to conclude whether reverse
engineering ought to be encouraged more or less strongly. Two Berkeley
professors, Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer, recently
performed such a feat in "The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering," and their results were given the imprimatur of the Yale Law
Journal.22 2 They cautiously laid the groundwork for their analysis:
[t]he economic effects of reverse engineering depend on a number
of factors, including the purpose for which it is undertaken, the
industrial context within which it occurs, how much it costs, how
220. Compaq I Portable Computer, http://oldcomputers.net/ compaqi.html (last visited Nov.
18, 2008).
221. See supra Part II.A.
222. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18.
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long it takes, whether licensing is a viable alternative, and how the
reverse engineer uses information learned in the reverse engineering
process.223
Then, the professors evaluated the effects of reverse engineering for
purposes ofenabling software interoperability. 224 The professors employed
the social welfare criterion discussed above: "incentives to develop
platforms," (a.k.a. first-level innovation), "incentives to develop
applications" (a.k.a. second-level innovation), "system prices" (a.k.a. the
public's access to the invention), and "wasted costs. 2 2 5 However, even
with the cognitive firepower of two Berkeley professors, and even in an
article worthy of the Yale Law Journal, neither empirical nor precise
conclusions were possible. Instead, the professors painted well-reasoned
but unfortunately broad strokes in reaching a theoretical conclusion that
reverse-engineering should be encouraged for purposes of enabling
interoperability:
It is difficult to integrate these disparate welfare effects into an
unassailable view as to whether reverse engineering for
interoperability purposes should be legal. On balance, we believe
that consumers benefit from interoperability because it encourages
the development of a larger variety of software applications from
a wider array of software developers with fewer wasted application
development costs. Incentives to develop platforms are generally
adequate owing to the high costs and difficulties of reverseengineering software. Furthermore, interoperability lessens the
potential for tipping into monopoly. Reverse engineering to achieve
interoperability may also lessen a monopoly platform provider's
market power by providing application developers with an
alternative means of entry if the monopolist's licensing terms are
unacceptable.226
Samuelson and Schotchmer's scorecard consisted, by necessity, of ratings
like "Worse (Adequate?)" and "Better (Too High?)."227 This Article cannot
"read the scales" with any greater level of precision. However, several

223. Id.at 1585.
224. Id. at 1607 (discussing reverse engineering in several other contexts, such as the
semiconductor industry).
225. Id.at 1621.
226. Id. at 1625-26.
227. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1621.
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warning signs indicate that too much weight has been placed on the
"restrictive" end of the reverse engineering scales.
V. WARNING SIGNS

A. Copyright Law Is Being Used as a Substitutefor PatentProtection
Copyright law states that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery .. .""' This
protection is afforded only by patent law, which has stricter requirements
and a more limited time frame.229 When copyright is used to award any
party sole use of an idea or function, lawmakers have distorted copyright
law.
Such a distortion occurs when software cannot be reverse engineered
to examine the program's unprotected elements, as the appeals courts in
all of the Sega-era cases noted. 3 ° However, because of the intertwined
nature of idea and expression within software, and because of the
gatekeeper function performed by access control measures, new
restrictions on reverse engineering allow parties to monopolize ideas using
the Copyright Act. Under the DMCA, a software access control measure
231
may only be circumvented for purposes of enabling interoperability.
Thus, the ideas and functions embodied in a computer program that is
encrypted or otherwise locked are given near-monopoly protection for the
life of the copyright.
The "100% compatible PC" might never have taken flight in the
DMCA era, assuming that IBM fashioned some form of access control
measure to protect its BIOS. Compaq's reverse engineering efforts were
undertaken to develop a competing BIOS with functionality identical to
228. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2007).
229. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Walton v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 251, 264 n.21 (Fed. Cl.
2008).
230. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 605 (9th Cir. 2000) ("If
Sony wishes to obtain a lawful monopoly on the functional concepts in its software, it must satisfy
the more stringent standards of the patent laws."); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975
F.2d 832,842 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("An author cannot acquire patent-like protection by putting an idea,
process, or method of operation in an unintelligible format and asserting copyright infringement
against those who try to understand that idea, process, or method of operation."); Sega Enters. Ltd.
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992) ("In order to enjoy a lawful monopoly over
the idea or functional principle underlying a work, the creator of the work must satisfy the more
stringent standards imposed by the patent laws.").
231. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2007).
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the IBM BIOS, not to achieve interoperability with the IBM BIOS. Under
the well-established boundaries of copyright law, Compaq should be
permitted to copy the unprotected functionality of IBM's BIOS, so long
as Compaq does not copy the expression with which IBM articulated these
functions. However, under the DMCA, Compaq violates the Copyright Act
unless it circumvents the access control measure "for the sole purpose of
identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary
to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program
' Even if Compaq could convince a court that the
with other programs."232
interoperability exception is not limited to interoperability with the
circumvented program, Compaq would also have to argue that hardware
devices fall within the DMCA's meaning of "computer program[s]," as a
BIOS enables interoperability between various pieces of hardware.2 33 A
court is likely to reject one-or both-of these arguments.
It may seem unfair or unwise that copyright law does not protect the
ideas embodied in expression, especially in the computer software context.
Perhaps the principle is best illustrated in a more traditional copyright
environment. Antonio Vivaldi's "Four Seasons" is one of the most
cherished musical compositions of all time. If written today, it would have
received copyright protection as a musical work.3 However, the idea of
a violin concerto that mimics the sounds of nature as the seasons progress
from spring to winter would be completely unprotected. Another composer
would be free to "reverse engineer" Vivaldi's composition by listening to
a recording or studying a printed score of the work in order to learn about
the work. Then, the composer would be free to write a competing violin
concerto that "sounds" like spring or winter, so long as she does not copy
the precise expressions Vivaldi used to portray his idea. Similarly, society
would not maximize progress in the arts by granting Matt Groening,
creator of The Simpsons, a monopoly over an animated comedy featuring
a dysfunctional family led by a dim-witted father, and as such, copyright
law is concerned with reproductions of the expression, such as bootleg
DVDs, and not reproductions of the idea (however blatant), such as Family
Guy.
Yet, in Congress's attempt to curtail expression-reproduction (which
was the rationale for the DMCA), it has severely curtailed ideareproduction.23 5 As it stands, copyright law now grants absolutely no idea
protection to copyrighted works lacking technological access control
measures and robust idea protection to copyrighted works protected by
232. Id.

233. Id.§ 101.
234. Id. § 102(a)(2).
235. S REP. No.105-190, at 8 (1998).
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technological access control measures. This demarcation is baffling from
a public policy perspective: an idea is no more deserving of monopoly
protection merely because it is distributed with a technological access
control measure. Patent law spells out the criteria for ideas that "deserve"
monopoly protection: utility, novelty, and non-obviousness.236 One might
argue that the presence of the access control measure indicates that the
author so valued his creation that he took the effort to protect it, which
leads to the conclusion that the idea is indeed "worth" protecting.
However, a computer program embodies the same ideas and functions at
the moment before and after the access control measure is implemented;
its objective value to society has not changed, even if there is an indication
of increased subjective value given by its creator.
Copyright law, even as it relates to computer programs, has never
before offered monopoly protection for ideas, processes, and functions.
This inconsistency is a warning sign that lawmakers have over-restricted
reverse engineering.
B. CopyrightLaw Is Being Used to Capture Secondary Markets
Aside from protecting the idea of a product, which falls under the
domain of patent law, certain parties are using reverse engineering
restrictions to monopolize ancillary markets, a practice that is
unacceptable under patent and copyright law.
The Sega-era plaintiffs were not able to use copyrights in game
consoles and first-party software titles to control the market for third-party
software titles, as was most pithily stated in Connectix: "Sony
understandably seeks control over the market for devices that play games
Sony produces or licenses. The copyright law, however, does not confer
such a monopoly."237
The DMCA has pushed us dangerously close to conferring such a
monopoly. In two well-publicized cases, manufacturing companies
attempted unsuccessfully to use copyright law to gain monopoly power
over the markets for replacement parts. In Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
ControlComponents, Inc., a printer manufacturer attempted to control the
market for replacement ink cartridges, and in ChamberlainGroup, Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc., a garage door manufacturer attempted to
control
the would
market not
for operate
garage with
door the
openers."'
each case,unless
the main
component
ancillaryIn
component
the

236. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
237. Sony, 203 F.3d at 607.
238. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
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latter performed a "secret handshake" to gain access to the main
component.239 Defendants reverse-engineered the various components to
create third-party ink cartridges and garage door openers.24 ° The respective
plaintiffs sued, claiming that defendants had infringed copyrights in the
authentication programs and violated the DMCA by circumventing
technological measures that controlled access to the copyrighted computer
programs that operated the machines.241 Professor Jane Ginsburg was
highly critical of these arguments:
The extraordinary consequence of plaintiffs' reasoning is that any
useful object whose workings are controlled by computer
programs-and today, that means an endless variety of consumer
and industrial goods-can come within the scope of section 1201
if the object's producer makes access to those programs subject to
an authentication sequence. As a policy matter, this result is
inconceivable.242
"Happily," according to Professor Ginsburg, plaintiffs' arguments were
rejected.243 Unhappily, however, the cases were not as open-and-shut as
one might expect, and the courts required some creativity to reach their
holdings.
The Lexmark court rejected the DMCA circumvention claim because
the access control measure controlled access to the unprotected
functionality of the program, not the copyrightable expression of the
program itself. The court held, "[i]t is not Lexmark's authentication
sequence that 'controls access' to the Printer Engine Program. It is the
purchase of a Lexmark printer that allows 'access' to the program." 2 ' The
Lexmark court found determinative that the secret handshake was not
2 45
necessary to view the object code of the printer software, only to use it.
In other words, the technological device did not prevent access to a work

239. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 530 ("Ifthe code calculated by the [toner cartridge's] microchip
matches the code calculated by the printer, the printer functions normally. If the two values do not
match, the printer returns an error message and will not operate, blocking consumers from using
toner cartridges that Lexmark has not authorized.")
240. Id, at 529; Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1183.
241. See supra text accompanying note 238.
242. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Prosand Cons ofStrengtheningIntellectualPropertyProtection:
TechnologicalProtectionMeasures and Section 1201 ofthe U.S. CopyrightAct, at 4 (Feb. 1,2007
version), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-960724.
243. Id
244. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546.
245. Id.at 546-47.
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protected by the Copyright Act, as required by the DMCA, because it did
not prevent access to any expression. 246
The Chamberlain court interpreted the DMCA as requiring a link
between circumvention and infringement.2 47 The Chamberlain court
focused on the purpose of the circumvention, exculpating those who
circumvent for legitimate reasons-such as creating an interoperable
those who circumvent for illegitimate
program or device-and 2inculpating
48
reasons-such as piracy.
Unfortunately, the reasoning of Lexmark may not apply in the context
of more advanced computer programs, where technological protection
measures control access to both functional and expressive content.
Lexmark's computer software had very thin copyright protection: only the
creative elements of the source code, such as its layout and comments. All
of this copyrighted expression was indeed accessible without using the
software.
Video game software, on the other hand, has multiple layers of
potentially copyrightable expression: the code itself, as well as the sounds
and images created by the game. If, as Lexmark held, DMCA applicability
turns on whether a technological protection measure controls access to
copyrightable expression, then reverse engineers in the area of advanced
software must proceed with caution.249
One could argue that the copyrightable expression that is viewed and
heard during use, such as the musical score, is just as accessible without
using the program as the object code, because anyone who purchases the
software can read the portion of the program's binary code that translates
into music. Under this interpretation of Lexmark, however, it is hard to
think of any "technological [protection] measure" other than encryption of
binary code, a limitation that the definitions of the DMCA seem to
246. 17 U. S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(A) (2007) ("n] o person shall circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act].").
247. Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
A copyright owner seeking to impose liability on an accused circumventor must
demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the circumvention at issue and a
use relating to a property right for which the Copyright Act permits the copyright
owner to withhold authorization-as well as notice that authorization was
withheld. A copyright owner seeking to impose liability on an accused trafficker
must demonstrate that the trafficker's device enables either copyright infringement
or a prohibited circumvention.
Id.
248. Id. at 1198.
249. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 548.
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contradict."' Also, while the musical score of a video game is typically a
pre-determined string of binary code on the game's disc, the visual images
created by a game are not.
A game displays images not by loading a pre-rendered series of images
on the screen but by "painting" the screen based on complicated rendering
software that employs thousands of variables. As such, the threedimensional image one sees when Mario hurtles through the clouds is not
itself captured in binary code in the software. The Ninth Circuit implicitly
recognized as copyrighted expression visual images created by gaming
software though it noted that any individual frame of an animated work251
is
"an insignificant portion of the complex copyrighted work as a whole."
Therefore, copyrighted expression can truly be accessed only by using a
video game or other audiovisual piece of software, which significantly
limits the applicability of Lexmark in this area.
As for Chamberlain, Ginsburg argues that a court's interpolation of
copyright violation into the requirements for circumvention liability may
run counter to legislative intent:
[s]ome activities subject to access controls do not implicate
traditional copyright owner rights such as reproduction and public
performance. For example, an access control may limit the number
of viewings of a motion picture distributed on a DVD .... The
legislative history indicates that the DMCA was designed in part
specifically to foster a variety of business models offering the
public a diversity of levels of access, for a diversity of prices. 2
If the DMCA intends to prohibit access control circumvention that does
not result in copyright infringement, then the reasoning behind the
Chamberlainholding is fallacious.
Thus, situations like bnetd are now possible, where Blizzard was able
to capture the market for platforms on which to play its software (the
Battle.net service) with the copyright protection of the software itself, even
though Sega, Nintendo, and Sony failed in similar attempts only a decade
earlier.253
The next great battle over the DMCA, reverse engineering, and
ancillary market capture is likely to involve the Apple iPod. Through the
use of a technological protection measure called FairPlay, Apple has been
able to ensure that songs downloaded using its iTunes program will
250.
251.
252.
253.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3) (2007).
Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000).
Ginsburg, supranote 242, at 6 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998)).
See supra Part II.B.
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operate only on Apple devices, such as the iPod.254 A computer scientist
reverse engineered FairPlay in such a way that iTunes tracks are playable
on any device but without sacrificing its piracy-prevention functionality.2"
Apple has yet to file suit, but if it does, the strength of the DMCA's
reverse engineering exception will once again be scrutinized. Section
1201 (f) exempts only program-to-program interoperability, and this case
would involve song-to-device interoperability. 2"6 As such, Apple may be
able to use an anti-piracy provision in copyright law to retain a monopoly
in hardware devices that are ancillary to the copyrighted software.
Of course, interpretations of the DMCA with regards to reverse
engineering are of no consequence if parties have an unlimited ability to
contractually restrict use of software, a topic discussed in the next section.
C. The CopyrightAct Has Become a "DefaultRule," Valid Only in the
Absence of a Contract
The increasing ability to expand protection for copyrighted works
through the use of non-negotiable "contracts" is troublesome for two
reasons. First, justifications for this contract-based approach are based on
assumptions about contract formation that are not present in the modem
software industry. Second, this approach is a threat to the delicate balance
of public policy that supports intellectual property law.
Freedom of contract is an admirable value for lawmaking bodies. The
ability to forge agreements based on private preferences is central to the
concept of liberty:
it must not be forgotten that the right of private contract is no small
part of the liberty of the citizen, and that the usual and most
important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and
enforce contracts[,] than to enable parties thereto to escape from
their obligation on the pretext of public policy, unless it clearly
appear that they contravene public right or the public welfare.2 57

254. See How Fair Play Works: Apple's iTunes DRM Dilemma, Roughly Drafted Media, Feb.
26, 2007, http://www.roughlydrafted. com/RD/RDM.Tech.Q 1.07/2A35 IC60-A4E5-4764-A083FF86 10E66A46.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
255. Id.; see also Robert Levine, Unlocking the iPod,FORTUNE, Oct. 30 2006, availableat
http://money.cnn.com/ magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2006/10/30/8391726/index.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2008).

256. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0(1) (2007).
257. Baltimore & O.S.R. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900).
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Of course, freedom of contract is no longer granted the same lofty status
as during the Lochner era,25 but the principles of America are inexorably
linked to the economic philosophies of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and
Jeremy Bentham, who "insisted [that] freedom of bargaining [is] the
fundamental and indispensable requisite of progress. 259
Even Lemley, an opponent of allowing parties to expand copyright
protections through contract, admits, "[t]he enforcement of agreements
between private parties is an intrinsic part of our system of laws, and is not
to be discarded lightly."' 6 Tom Bell and Maureen A. O'Rourke agree,
concluding that copyright law should be treated as a default rule, valid
only in the absence of private agreement.26'
One argument advanced in favor of copyright law as a default rule is
the Coase Theorem. According to the Coase Theorem, bargaining achieves
an optimal allocation of resources compared to government regulation in
the absence of transaction costs. 262 Efficient market-driven outcomes
require the presence of knowledge and assent in contract formation:
Two fundamental requirements of the neoclassical model of social
ordering through private exchange are knowledge of contract terms
and meaningful (i.e., voluntary and fully informed) assent. Both are
necessary (though not sufficient) requirements for an "unregulated"
market to reach the efficient equilibrium point; the absence of either
258. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("The general right to make a contract in
relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of
the Federal Constitution."), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92
(1937).
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract... [Rather,] the liberty
safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law
against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the
people ... This essential limitation of liberty in general governs freedom of
contract in particular.
Id.
259. Samuel Williston, FreedomofContract,6 CORNELLL.Q. 365,366 (1921) ("Jeffersonian
democracy finds its cardinal tenet in restricting government [] activities and allowing the individual
free play.").
260. Lemley, supra note 95, at 1284.
261. See Tom W. Bell, FairUse vs. FaredUse: The Impact ofAutomatedRights Management
on Copyright's FairUse Doctrine,76 N.C. L. REv. 557 (1998); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing
the BoundaryBetween CopyrightandContract:CopyrightPreemptionofSoftware License Terms,
45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995).
262. DAvID BESANKO & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS: AN INTEGRATED

APPROACH 747-49 (2002).
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or both may signal a market failure justifying some form of
adjustment.263
However, in the modem consumer arena, where terms are dictated by the
seller and standardized across sellers, and where buyers have questionable
means to assent or decline, the requirements for efficient outcomes via
private bargaining are arguably absent. 2"
First, the contracts included with mass-produced software are dictated
entirely by the seller, who selects all the terms and offers no opportunity
to negotiate. Aside from the policy ramifications of this inequity, which
are discussed below, the complete lack of actual negotiations substantially
decreases the likelihood that the buyer understands the terms of the
contract. To the typical purchaser of software, the terms of a boilerplate
software license are as informative, understandable, and attention-grabbing
as Judge Dyk's hypothetical black dot.265 For better or worse, the
263. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management, "97 MICH. L. REv. 462,482 (1998); see also Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption:
The Law and Policyof IntellectualPropertyLicensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. 111, 169-70 (1999).
264. Lemley, supra note 95, at 1286-87.
The arguments for contract, moreover, lose much of their force in the case of
shrinkwrap licenses governing software transactions. Contract law is at its
strongest where there is an actual agreement between the parties. That is, after all,
the basis of a contract. Unfortunately, the ideal assumptions behind a "bargained
contract"--relatively equal bargaining power, actual discussion and agreement as
to individual terms, and joint drafting-often do not reflect reality. In practice,
contracts are often entered into between large corporations and consumers. The
corporation drafts the contract and sets the price. The consumer merely decides
whether or not to sign the contract. In this circumstance, there has been no
meaningful "bargaining" over the contract at all, and certainly not over particular
terms contained in the form drafted by the large corporation.
Id.
265. Robert A. Hillman& JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contractingin the Electronic
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 446 (2002).
Reading and understanding boilerplate terms is difficult and time consuming for
consumers. Consumers recognize that they are unlikely to understand the lengthy
and complicated legal jargon in the boilerplate. To make matters worse,
consumers commonly encounter standard forms when they are in a hurry.
Businesses also can create boilerplate that is difficult to read by using small print,
a light font, and all-capital lettering and by burying important terms in the middle
of the form.

GAME OVER FOR REVERSE ENGINEERING?

consumer is unlikely to have knowledge of a contract's terms.
Second, no "meeting of the minds" occurs between buyer and seller
with respect to the terms included in most software licenses. Until
recently, assent to a license was indicated by simply keeping or using the
software, and the license was included as a paper document amidst the
slew of documentation that came with a commercial software package.266
Today, buyers are given a slightly better opportunity to recognize and
assent to license terms, as the license is typically displayed on the
computer screen,267and the program is not installed until the user clicks an
"I agree" button.
Still, one may argue that the terms of the license agreement are first
presented to the buyer after the point of purchase, which is the moment the
contract is formed. 268 As such, the license is merely an offer to modify
whatever agreement was reached when the user accepted the offer to
purchase the software. This argument has met with mixed results in the
context of license terms included in the packaging of computer
hardware.269
266. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 257 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988) (the license
at issue stated the following: "BY USING ANY OF THE ENCLOSED DISKETTE(S), YOU
AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE
LICENSE PROVISIONS, RETURN THESE MATERIALS TO YOUR DEALER, IN ORIGINAL
PACKAGING WITHIN 3 DAYS FROM RECEIPT, FOR A REFUND.").
267. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 634-35 (8th Cir. 2005). To some
extent, the older method for registering assent was necessitated by limits on disk space that
prevented programs from displaying the license agreement on the screen. For instance, the license
for EA Sports Madden 2007 software program requires eleven kilobytes of disk space. By
comparison, the entire Super Mario Brothers Nintendo program requires forty-one kilobytes of
space.
268. Lemley, supra note 263, at 120.
269. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000).
Gateway argues that plaintiff demonstrated acceptance of the arbitration provision
by keeping the computer more than five days after the date of delivery. Although
the Standard Terms purport to work that result, Gateway has not presented
evidence that plaintiff expressly agreed to those Standard Terms. Gateway states
only that it enclosed the Standard Terms inside the computer box for plaintiff to
read afterwards.
Id. Compare Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing
up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales operations such
as Gateway's had to read the four-page statement of terms before taking the
buyer's credit card number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather than
enlighten many potential buyers.
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Further, assent is not fully voluntary in the absence of an adequate
means of rejecting the contract terms. The End User License Agreement
for Microsoft Windows XP contains the following provision: "IF YOU
DO NOT AGREE, DO NOT INSTALL, COPY, OR USE THE
SOFTWARE; YOU MAY RETURN IT TO YOUR PLACE OF
PURCHASE FOR A FULL REFUND, IF APPLICABLE., 270 A newer
Blizzard Entertainment program, entitled World of Warcraft, contains a
similar provision. 21 This contract gives little choice to the buyer, as no
major retailer offers refunds for opened software.272 By the time the buyer
sees the contract terms, he can either accept the terms or throw away the
software without hope of refund. Windows Vista provides an option to
return the software directly to Microsoft for a refund (plus $7 in shipping
expenses), provided that the user completes a list of information, is willing
to wait up to four weeks for "processing," and has a physical address
("sorry, no P.O. boxes"). 273 "In these circumstances," Professor Lemley
argues, "it is simply unrealistic to believe that a failure to return the
software for a refund constitutes any form of 'agreement' to the terms of
the form license. 274
Id.
270. Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition (Retail) End-User License Agreement for
Microsoft Software, availableat http://www.microsoft.com/korea/windowsxp/home/eula.mspx (last
visited Oct. 21, 2008).
271. World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, available at http://www.woweurope.com/en/legal/eula.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2008) ("If you do not agree with the Terms of
Use, then (i) you should not register for an Account to play the Game, and (ii) you should arrange
to return the Game to the place where you purchased the Game within thirty (30) days of the
original purchase.").
272. See Returning Software, amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeld--901928 (last visited Oct. 23, 2008) ("Software sold in New
condition which has been opened, and Software products which are sold as Used and are not
materially different than the item purchased, cannot be returned."); Returns Policy-Shipping and
Retums-Help--Walmart. com, http://www.walmart.com/retums (last visited Oct. 23, 2008)
("Computer software: Must be returned unopened."); Store Return Policy, bestbuy.com, supranote
195 ("Opened computer software, movies, music and video games can be exchanged for the
identical item but cannot be returned for a refund.").
273. Microsoft North American Retail Product Refund Guidelines, available at
http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/productrefumd/refund.mspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
274. Lemley, supra note 95, at 1289.
Even if we accept the notion of blanket assent uncritically, a significant
percentage of the consumers purchasing the software may be unable to return it
for a refund. A second group may choose not to return the software because they
believe the shrinkwrap license is unenforceable-a commonly held belief among
software consumers and one with significant support in the current case law. A
third group may choose not to return the software because it is simply too much
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Purchasers of retail software have uncertain knowledge of contract
terms, and assent is often the only practicable choice. In these respects, the
software market fails to satisfy the requirements of the neoclassical model
of social ordering through private contracting.275 Still, many argue that
boilerplate contracts are socially desirable because negotiation is unwanted
and inefficient with respect to the minor details underlying a retail
transaction.276 Indeed, sophisticated companies are usually better-equipped
to craft many contract terms (such as risk allocation), the typical consumer
does not even want to read a contract, let alone negotiate each and every
term, and retail software would be prohibitively expensive if producers
had to employ an army of agents to handle negotiations.
However, permitting boilerplate contracts to avoid transaction costs is
most prudent where "[c]ompetition in the market for the goods or services
can provide courts with some assurance that businesses will not supply
exploitative terms. ' The level of competition in many software markets
is less than reassuring. Three companies-Nintendo, Sony, and
Microsoft--control 100% of the market for new video game consoles.27
279
Microsoft Windows has a 90.29% share of the operating system market.
Google has a 79.90% share of the search engine market.28 ° On the other
hand, distribution is less lopsided in applications markets, though there are
notable exceptions, such as office software (Microsoft Office) and sports
games (Electronic Arts).28 ' As such, there is room to debate whether
effort, or because they need the software right away and cannot afford to wait and
select a different brand. A final group may object to particular terms in a license,
but may be unwilling to reject the software as a whole, perhaps because they
cannot find an equally attractive alternative that does not require a shrinkwrap
license.
Id.
275. See supra text accompany notes 260-63.
276. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 265, at 435-37 ("The consumer, engaging in a
rough but reasonable cost-benefit analysis ...understands that the costs of reading, interpreting,
and comparing standard terms outweigh any benefits of doing so and therefore chooses not to read
the form carefully or even at all.").
277. Id.at 442.
278. See Video Game Chartz, http://www.vgchartz.com/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
279. See Operating System Market Share for September 2008, http://marketshare.hitslink.
com/report.aspx?qprid=8 (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
280. See Search Engine Market Share for September 2008, http://marketshare.hitslink.com/
report.aspx?qprid=4 (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
281. Steve Harm, More to Life Than the Office, BusINEss WEEK, July 3, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_27/b3991412.htm (last visitedNov. 19,2008);
Matt Richtel, ElectronicArts and ESPN Sign 15-Year Deal to Sell Games, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/18/technology/18ganes.html (last visited Nov. 19,2008).
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boilerplate software contracts lead to an efficient allocation of resources;
the answer may depend on the sub-market in question.
Second, and more damning, the increased ability to impose software
licenses completely ignores the underpinnings of intellectual property law,
which seek to balance the interests of society and artist/inventor by
providing whatever limited set of rights is necessary to induce intellectual
creation. 282 Instead, the software industry is leaning toward a world of
"'private legislation,' in which parties who are in a position to write
283
contracts can jointly impose uniform terms that no one can escape.,
Where the creator defines the terms of "copyright" protection, and
competition is not robust, the incentive level will be set too high, and
society will not make optimal use of the creation.
Bowers, the leading glimpse into the world of private copyright
legislation, illustrates just how much creators may shift the precarious
balance of intellectual property policy with contract law. The contract in
Bowers "unambiguously prohibits 'reverse engineering,"' which the court
defined as "to study or analyze (a device, as a microchip for computers)
in order to learn details of design, construction, and operation, perhaps to
produce a copy or an improved version. ,284 What if the Bowers defendant
had merely used the plaintiff's program? When an individual uses a
program, she is arguably analyzing the program in order to learn details of
its design and operation, at least at a semi-subconscious level. The first
time she operates the program, she analyzes the layout of the screen. When
she first needs to execute a function, such as "Tools -> Word Count" (in
Microsoft Word), she analyzes the menus to deduce the location of the
function. As a gamer uses Blizzard's WarCraft, she analyzes the actions
of the computer-controlled opponents to learn how to best combat her
fictional enemies. In the broader sense of reverse engineering ("the process
of extracting know-how or knowledge from a human-made artifact"),285
everybody reverse engineers when using any program, in violation of most
end user license agreements. While software creators are unlikely to sue
customers for learning how to use their programs, a creator has a colorable
contract action against a user that, having deduced the central idea of the
creator's program by mere use of that program, develops a competing
software title. Absurd? Certainly. But the Bowers majority offers no
indication that it would draw a line between the actual scenario and this
hypothetical.
282. See supra Part IV.
283. Lemley, supra note 263, at 148.
284. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Random
House Unabridged Dictionary (1993)).
285. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1577.
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Nor is competition likely to offer a panacea to the policy dilemma.
Even accepting the dubious assumption that various software packages
offer materially different terms, 286 a free-rider problem and inadequate
information will almost certainly prevent consumers from favoring
software titles that have innovation-friendly terms, and as such, software
producers will feel no pressure to include these terms. For instance, few
buyers would likely prefer a software program whose contract does not
modify the Sega right to reverse engineer. Almost all purchasers of
software have no intention of engaging in reverse engineering and are
indifferent to this license term, whereas commercial software producers
are highly interested in including a no-reverse-engineering clause. Thus,
the market-based outcome dictates that such a clause is optimal, as it gives
benefit to one party without apparent cost to the other. However, all
buyers-as members of society-benefit from the right to287reverse
engineer, as it leads to innovations that are beneficial to society.
Even if consumers were cognizant of this benefit, free-rider theory
suggests that an individual consumer would hesitate to alter her purchase
decision unless the competing packages were otherwise identical. If
Software X (reverse engineering acceptable) lacked one feature found in
Software Y (reverse engineering prohibited) or was identical but cost one
additional dollar, we might prefer Software X as a society, but Software
Y is almost certain to "win" in the marketplace. If Software X is produced
by a different company than Software Y, Company X would cease to exist
in a perfectly competitive market. If Software X and Software Y are
produced by the same company-that is, the company is merely
employing price discrimination by charging a higher price (almost
certainly more than our hypothetical one dollar) to those who wish to
reverse engineer-then the outcome is equivalent to granting full idea
protection. Here, the company is offering to license the unprotected

286. Hillman & Rachlinski, supranote 230, at 439 ("most businesses will offer terms similar
to those offered by their competitors. Less experienced businesses simply copy their senior
counterparts.").
287. SeeNetanel, supra note 183, at 296 ("Robust public debate, the spread of knowledge, and
the questioning of cultural hierarchy are of paramount importance to a democratic society. To the
extent that these activities bolster democratic institutions, all citizens benefit from their
occurrence."); Lemley, supranote 95, at 1278-79 (noting that copyright law's "allocation of rights
reflects a 'delicate balance' between many different interests, and not all of those interests are
represented in licensing contracts. Allowing private parties to avoid the effects of intellectual
property law would undermine that balance[,]" and arguing that the enactment of a U.C.C. code that
would increase software producer's ability to impose licenses "would represent a complete victory
for the forces of contract over the forces of federal law-and for licensors over licensees,
consumers, and the public.").
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elements of its program, much like a patentee licensing the use of his or
her patented design.
This "price discrimination" world is an improvement over a world in
which contracts completely obliterate the right to reverse engineer. After
all, those individuals who engage in reverse engineering are likely to reap
the commercial benefits from their efforts, so they should be willing to pay
a disproportionate share of society's cost for obtaining the innovation.
However, any purely market-based system is likely to suffer from
externalities-third-party interests that are not considered by the
contracting parties leading to a societally undesirable price/quantity level.
In the world where the right to reverse engineer must be purchased, parties
are unlikely to capture all the societal benefit from innovation-a positive
externality that leads to an insufficient demand for reverse engineering.
The impossibility of including every member of society in these
negotiations is a transaction cost that impedes the Coasian efficient
outcome.
Copyright law is an attempt to carefully balance creators' incentives
versus the public good, in accordance with Congress's constitutional
charge,288 and the multitude of interests involved in setting this public
policy cannot be served by "private legislation." Just as the proverbial fox
is not allowed to guard the chicken coop, copyright owners cannot be
trusted to grant themselves just enough monopoly power to earn a return
adequate to incentivize their work, which is the amount of monopoly
power authorized by the Constitution.289 Nor can we trust the market to
reach this equilibrium, thanks to a free-rider problem, a too-imperfect
bargaining arena, and inadequate competition. Without limitations on the
ability to contract around certain tenets of copyright law, society is
unlikely to continue benefiting from the idea-expression dichotomy, a
multitude of fair uses (including the right to reverse engineer), and the
limited term of protection.290 As such, copyright law cannot be thought of
288. Netanel, supra note 183, at 385.
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
290. Lemley, supranote 263, at 128-32. For the opposite viewpoint, see Raymond T. Nimmer,
Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract And Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 827, 828-29 (1998).
As I read some of the commentary about the future of copyright in the information
industries on the Internet, it often appears as if some believe that we are facing an
impending big bang as the fields of copyright and contract head toward some
unclearly defined, but cataclysmic conflict... Nothing could be further from the
truth and, indeed, the fundamental premise is flawed.

GAME OVER FOR REVERSE ENGINEERING?

as a "default rule," valid only in the absence of alternate terms. Cases like
Bowers and ProCD,which advocate for unbridled freedom of contract in
intellectual property, are warning signs that the freedom to reverse
engineer is in peril.
VI. CONCLUSION

These changes in copyright and contract law are most likely linked to
the fight against piracy in the digital age. 9 ' Preventing piracy is a laudable
goal for intellectual property. The exponential growth in piracy enabled by
the internet is a frightening enemy for the artists, creators, and innovators
who "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.... "292 Nowhere is

this devastation more evident than in the music industry, where sales have
plummeted while a billion songs are illegally traded online per month.293
However, in their attempt to stem the tide of piracy, legislators and courts
should not allow reverse engineering to become collateral damage. The
American economy is built on innovation, and our leadership in
technological industries is under constant challenge by brilliant engineers
and scientists around the world.294 The unprecedented shifts in copyright
doctrine-idea protection, ancillary market protection, and contract law's
usurpation of copyright law-are warning signs that the ability to reverse
engineer is less robust than in the Sega era. If America is to continue
encouraging innovation, these warning signs must not be ignored.

291. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.

293. Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, Plunge Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
2007, at http://online.wsj.com/articleemail/SB 117444575607043728-1MyQjAxMDE3NzIOMTQy
NDEIWj.html.
294. See The Task Force on the Future of American Innovation, The Knowledge Economy:
Is the United StatesLosing Its CompetitiveEdge? (Feb. 16,2005), http://www.futureofinnovation.

org/PDF/Benchmarks.pdf (noting the importance of innovation to the American economy and
detailing the various statistical measures by which America's leadership is declining).
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